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DaLaw2
fbaef94082
* feat: Phase 2-5 — architecture, detection, security, SOAR, operations Architecture: - Hexagonal port traits (10 modules migrated from Arc<Database>) - Domain model types moved to model/ directory - Constants centralized + 7 made runtime-configurable via DB - Dead Error/Log variants cleaned up, SystemLog split Detection (Phase 5): - Detection orchestrator with dedup + enrichment + source attribution - Cross-flow correlation engine: botnet, scan, lateral movement (T9) - Temporal beaconing detector: CV-based C2 periodicity (T10) - LRU flow eviction replacing O(n) min_by_key scan (T12) Security hardening: - 7 fixes: alg:none, config secret leak, HTTPS open redirect, log traversal, HKDF salt, SOAR whitelist+cooldown, operator validation - 4 memory safety fixes: LRU dedup, frequency cleanup, drift cap, clock - Envelope encryption for secrets (AES-256-GCM + HKDF) - 17 new tests (SecretStore + SOAR conditions) SOAR (Phase 3): - Multi-condition playbooks (5 condition types, AND logic) - Playbook update API (PUT + toggle endpoints) Operations (Phase 4): - Dynamic log level, system control APIs (shutdown/restart) - HTTP config hot reload, spawn_blocking for CPU-bound work - CLI encrypt-db / decrypt-db commands - Audit log API Log level audit: - 16 variants adjusted (noisy hot-path → TRACE/DEBUG) - 5 dead variants removed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address Copilot review — 6 issues from PR #18 1. Botnet detector source_ip was set to victim dst_ip, causing SOAR to block the victim instead of the attacker 2. HTTPS redirect host header injection: validate host is private IP, localhost, or .local hostname before constructing redirect URL 3. smtp_password plaintext residue: clear settings table after writing to SecretStore to prevent pre-migration plaintext from persisting 4. install.sh: add apt-get update before install on Debian/Ubuntu 5. download_log OOM risk: add 50MB file size limit before reading 6. update_config restart trigger: check return value, report if shutdown already in progress instead of claiming success Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address Agent Team review — security, perf, correctness Security: - S1: Add RBAC permission check for /api/logs/ and /api/audit/ endpoints (previously any authenticated user could access) - S2/S3: Remove report_dir and log_dir from configurable settings to prevent arbitrary directory write via config API - A2: Pin DNS-resolved IPs in webhook reqwest client to prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU attack (resolve() instead of re-resolving) Performance: - P7: Add 50K key cap to FrequencyTracker to prevent unbounded growth under DDoS (was unbounded, worst case 1.6GB) - P9: Increase ML alert broadcast capacity 100 → 1024 to prevent lost alerts during DDoS spikes (3 subscribers contend on 100-slot buffer) - P2: Reduce FLOW_MAX_PERIODS 10000 → 1000 (saves 144KB/flow, feature extraction only uses aggregate stats) - P1: Remove unnecessary FlowKey clone on hot path (~1.9MB/s saved) - P5: Beaconing detector: split analyze_and_alert into read-lock scan + selective write-lock update (reduces DashMap contention) Correctness: - A4: Capture correlation counts inside DashMap guard before dropping, eliminating TOCTOU in logged values (botnet, scan, lateral) - A6: Log warning when SOAR playbook action params JSON is malformed instead of silently replacing with empty object Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add trainer submodule, update frontend submodule - Add net-guardia-trainer submodule (ParrotXray/NetGuardia-Trainer@dalaw2-dev) - Update frontend submodule with code quality fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
NetGuardia
Project Overview
NetGuardia is a high-performance network security solution that combines eBPF XDP technology with deep learning models to provide advanced network protection. The system operates as a standalone network appliance that can run on any Ubuntu-based system with compatible network hardware.
Core Technologies
- eBPF XDP Technology - Provides high-performance packet processing directly at the data link layer
- Deep Learning Models - Identifies and predicts potential network attacks with intelligent threat detection
- Hardware Integration - Designed to work with Intel i350 T2 and similar enterprise-grade network interface cards
Functional Modules
Resource Overview
- Real-time control system occupancy rate
Dashboard Overview
- Real-time network traffic monitoring and visualization
- Recent traffic statistics and trend analysis
Detailed Traffic Statistics
- Detailed traffic usage information per IP address
Network Access Control
- IPv4/IPv6 whitelist and blacklist management
- Precise port-level access control
System Features
- High Performance - Low-latency packet processing with minimal network performance impact
- User-Friendly - Cross-platform web management interface with intuitive operation
- Reliability - Hardware-accelerated processing ensures stable operation
- Scalability - Modular design supports functional expansion
System Requirements
- Ubuntu-based operating system (Ubuntu 24.04 LTS or newer recommended)
- Dual-port network interface card (Intel i350 T2 or compatible XDP-capable NIC)
- Root/sudo access for eBPF program loading
Hardware Compatibility
NetGuardia is designed to work on any Ubuntu-based system meeting the following requirements:
- Network Interface: Any dual-port NIC supporting XDP native or offload mode (Intel i350 T2 recommended)
- CPU: Multi-core processor recommended for optimal performance
- Memory: 8GB RAM minimum, 16GB or more for high-traffic environments
The system is not limited to embedded platforms and can be deployed on standard server hardware, virtual machines, or dedicated appliances running Ubuntu.